Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 2001

Article 3

5-2001

Information Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing
Transactions
Ronald J. Mann

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Mann, Information Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing Transactions, 54
Vanderbilt Law Review 1625 (2001)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol54/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Information Technology and Non-Legal
Sanctions in Financing Transactions
Ronald J. Mann

54 Vand. L. Rev. 1627 (2001)

This Essay investigates the effect of advances in information technology on the private institutions that businesses
use to resolve information asymmetries in financing transactions. The first part of the Essay discusses how information
technology can permit direct verification of the information,
obviating the problem entirely; the Essay discusses the example
of the substitution of the debit card for the check, which provides an immediate payment that obviates the need for the
merchant to consider whether payment will be forthcoming
when the check is presented to the bank on which it is drawn.
The second part of the Essay discusses how advances in
information technology can solve information problems indirectly: leaving the problem in place to some degree but mitigating its severity. The Essay uses three examples. First, it discusses how advances in information technology improve the
functioning of reputationalverification systems, with a special
emphasis on the dis-intermediation of securities issuance.
Second, the Essay discusses the rise of intermediationby pooling in the area of securitization. The Essay closes by discussing how information technology has facilitated the rise of the
information merchant, which can sell information directly to
those who need it for their transactions.
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The problem of information asymmetry is at the core of all
financing transactions. It is almost inevitable that the party seeking funds will possess information not already known to the parties
that might provide funds. Because the information asymmetry increases the costs of the transaction-the lender should charge more
to accommodate the risks associated with the borrower's informational advantage-any arrangement that mitigates the information
asymmetry has the potential to lower the costs of the transaction.
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Parties faced with that problem can respond in any number
of ways. The simplest response would be to leave the problem unresolved, accepting the premium that the lender would charge as a
cost of the transaction. Alternatively, the lender might expend
funds to ascertain the relevant information directly (through a tedious process of "due diligence").
Often, however, businesses can use mechanisms to verify the
truth of the borrower's assertions, mechanisms that generally
might be called verification institutions.' From the perspective of
the legal system as a whole, those institutions range along a spectrum from mechanisms provided by the law-a suit for misrepresentation or fraud, for example 2-- to mechanisms that operate almost completely outside the law, such as reputational sanctions.8 In
between those two mechanisms fall such institutions as secured
credit, for which legal recourse is formally part of the arrangement,
4
but not demonstrably crucial to the effectiveness of the institution.
If we believe that commercial enterprises in the longer run
generally design their transactions so as to minimize the costs of
such information problems, then the parties to those transactions
generally should select the mechanism that best resolves the information problem at the lowest cost. 5 Thus, two features of the current environment suggest that the current set of institutions is unstable. The first of those is a general rise in the costs of legal sanctions, reflected both in the increasing pecuniary costs of litigation
and slowing rates of resolution of civil disputes presented to the
courts. 6 The second is a general decrease in the cost of acquiring,
processing, and analyzing information. Taken together, those two
effects would presage a significant shift in the balance of institutions away from formal legal sanctions-which apparently are be-

1.

For a thorough analysis of those institutions as they currently exist, see Ronald J.

Mann, Verification Institutions in FinancingTransactions,87 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999).

2.

See id. at 2248-49 (discussing the suit for misrepresentation as a type of verification in.

stitution).
3.
See id. at 2252-57 (discussing the mechanics of reputational sanctions).
4.
See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidationof Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 159, 221-32 (1997) (discussing case studies illustrating the generally limited usefulness of
foreclosure and repossession on secured loans).
5.
The assumption of rational transaction design obviously is less plausible for consumer
transactions than for commercial transactions. But even in consumer transactions, there is
reason to expect some rationality in transaction design given the relatively competitive markets
for providing financing to consumers.
6.
That point, of course, is well-known. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:
How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957-61 (2000). I
will not discuss it further here, but simply assume it as part of the background against which I
work.
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coming more expensive and less effective-to non-legal sanctionswhich should become more effective as information-related costs
7
continue to fall.
This Essay does not attempt to prove that point by examination of the non-legal sanctions that appear in a random sample of
financing transactions or by case studies drawn to represent all
major types of financing transactions. On the contrary, this Essay
has a much more modest scope. It provides illustrations drawn from
four separate areas in which advances in information technology
already have begun to alter the traditional institutions, leading in
each case to a rise in transactions that depend less heavily on the
traditional legal sanction associated with the older arrangement.
Because those illustrations are selected primarily because of their
visible conformity to my thesis, it is entirely likely that other observers could locate contrary examples from sectors with which I
am not familiar. The illustrations remain valuable, however, for
what they do show, which is the powerful potential for information
technology to substantially restructure transactional design in
ways that have nothing whatsoever to do with the legal system or
the effectiveness of legal sanctions.
I begin by discussing the possibility that decreased information costs will allow creditors to obtain information directly, removing the uncertainty that created the information problem. Next,
I discuss how falling information costs support a general increase in
the feasibility of reputational sanctions. My third topic is the rise of
securitization, which essentially uses information technology to
lower the costs of uncertainty through the pooling and spreading of
ever-greater risks. Finally, I discuss the rise of the information
merchant, specializing in the collection and sale of information of
value to the prospective lender.
From a wholly economic perspective, the general effectiveness of those various institutions is a cause for celebration: it is difficult to see why they would succeed and spread if they did not
function by lowering the costs of information problems, thus lowering the costs of funds to risky enterprises, and thus, in the end,
fostering the development and success of those businesses. One
possible concern, however, is that the spread of those institutions
increases the value of ever more detailed information that might be

7. For a spirited paean to the increasing significance of information, see Peter F. Drucker,
The Rise of the Knowledge Society, WILSON Q., Spring 1993, at 52.
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relevant to the assessment of the creditworthiness and more general reliability of individuals and their enterprises.8
The message of this Essay is that the privacy implications of
the Information Age cut in two directions. We all share an interest
in limiting the intrusive collection and dissemination of information
about our affairs,9 but rules that hinder the flow of that information
easily can hinder the development of the less expensive financing
institutions that cheap information has fostered. In an era filled
with lamentations about the high costs and inefficiency of conventional litigation, we should think twice before stifling nascent institutions that provide cheaper and more effective devices for resolving information problems.
I. DIRECT VERIFICATION OF INFORMATION
The most obvious effect of information technology is to lower
the costs of obtaining and analyzing information. Although cost reductions have a variety of less direct effects, the most obvious one is
that sometimes they permit direct verification of information. Thus,
in some cases, a business now will be able to design a transaction in
a way that permits it to verify directly information that, in an earlier time, could not practicably have been acquired contemporaneously with that transaction. For those transactions, the need for a
verification institution (and its attendant costs) drops out entirely.
The checking system offers a fine and fluid example of that
process. Merchants that accept checks, for the most part, have to
rely on the check-writer's assertions that the check-writer's account
contains sufficient funds to cover the check and that the checkwriter will permit use of those funds to cover the check. If those assertions turn out to be false-if the check bounces-the merchant
will suffer a loss. It is not that the merchant has no remedy-if the

8.
For a discussion of the types of information being collected, see Privacy, RED HERRING,
Sept. 1999, at 92 (unattributed column) (detailing particular types of information collected by
various websites); Peter P. Swire, FinancialPrivacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 464-69 (1999); Diogo Teixeira, CustomerData Could Become
Banks' Best Asset, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19, 1999, at 10, 10 (suggesting that customer information
related to Internet purchases has an aggregate value of about $20 billion per year).
9. Recently collected data suggest that increasing familiarity with the Internet is increasing, not decreasing, consumer concerns about data privacy. See Shopping the Web: A Detailed
Look at the Online Buying Process,in E-COMMERCE CONSUMERS: WHAT, WHERE AND WHY THEY
BUY 12-13 figs.8-9 (The Standard and Odyssey ed., Spring 2000) (unpublished report, on file with
author) (presenting survey results showing that 82% of all online shoppers, 86% of female shoppers, and 88% of experienced online shoppers would be "much more likely" to buy from a Web
retailer that promises not to share personal information).
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merchant has performed its role in the transactions, the merchant
can file an action against the customer seeking to recover the
amount of the check. 10 Alternatively, the merchant can pay a third
party (a lawyer or collection agent) to attempt to obtain the funds
from the check-writer. The sad truth, though, is that neither of
those courses of action is likely to leave the merchant in a position
as good as the position that he would have occupied if the check had
been paid in the first instance. The loss to the merchant from the
bounced check-the unpaid amount and the costs expended in collection efforts-arises inevitably from the merchant's failure to
verify the check-writer's assertions at the point of sale.
Because those costs are significant, many retail merchants
use a common verification institution to lower their net losses from
nonpayment of checks. Specifically, they pay a third party a small
portion of every payment to verify the likelihood of payment by determining whether the check-writer is reliable." For example, in
1999, U.S. merchants verified 8.3 billion checks worth a total of
about $428 billion. 12 The process is a simple one: at the point of
sale, an employee swipes the check (capturing the customer's bank
account information) or driver's license and transmits the information over a telephone connection to the verification service, which
examines whatever information sources it maintains to determine if
the transaction should be authorized. 13 Those sources sometimes
include merely negative information (past bad checks and the like),
but in other cases they also include positive past credit information
or, in some cases, more sophisticated scoring systems. 14 That serv-

10. See U.C.C. § 3-310(b) (2000) (permitting holder of bounced check to pursue drawer on
underlying obligation); id. § 3-414(b) (permitting holder to pursue drawer on bounced check). If
that is impractical given the amount of the check (as it often must be), the merchant's recourse

might be limited to referring the bad-check writer for criminal prosecution, a course that costs
the merchant less but also is directed less pointedly at recovery of the merchant's loss.
11. It is not clear to me why those services have not developed a way to verify the account
balance directly at the time of the transaction. My best guess is that banks would be unwilling
to release that information to third parties, although banks are happy to use it to implement
their own debit-card products, which are discussed below.
12.

Check Authorization 1999, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA). May

2000, at 1, 8-9 tbL That reflects a market penetration of just over 28%, given the 29.35 billion
checks written in retail purchase transactions in 1998 (1999 statistics not yet being available).
See Payment Systems, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Dec. 1999, at 1, 6.
Interestingly, the market penetration is increasing rapidly-the number of verified checks rose
25% between 1998 and 1999. Id.
13. See Check Authorization 1999. supranote 12.
14. See id. at 9 tbl.

1632

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:4:1627

ice is relatively inexpensive, generally costing about fifteen to
twenty cents per check. 15
Some services, however, go farther to include not merely an
assertion regarding past check-writing habits, but also a guaranty:
the service agrees that it will bear the loss that arises if the check
in fact is dishonored. In 1999, check guarantee services covered 907
million checks worth a total of $81 billion. 16 The process works
much the same way as the verification process, except that the
service agrees to bear the loss if the check bounces. That service,
however, is much more expensive, ranging from a low end of 1 percent to 2 percent of the face amount of the check at a high-volume
and relatively low-risk merchant (such as a grocer), to a high end of
5 percent at a casino or other high-risk merchant. 17 Although those
services do not remove the cost entirely, merchants use them because the net effect of the service reduces the aggregate losses from
the unverified information more effectively than the traditional
18
method of a post-hoc lawsuit.
Even the check-guaranty service, however, leaves the merchant with a substantial loss from the incompletely verified information (the cost of the service and the merchant's share of any remaining bad checks). New technologies, however, have made it
practicable to reduce the losses from unverified payment commitments much more completely by providing payment systems in
which the consumer's assertions about willingness and ability to
pay can be verified directly at the time of sale. Although the options
are evolving rapidly,' 9 the most prominent success to date is the
point-of-sale debit card.

15. See id. at 8-9 tbl. (reporting revenues of $1.43 billion to verify 8.3 billion checks worth
$428 billion).

16. See id. at 9 tbl. Those statistics also reflected a 16% increase over the previous year.
Check Authorization 1998, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), May 1999, at 1, 8.
Not surprisingly, the average check for which a merchant sought a guaranty is significantly
larger than the average verified check ($89 versus $52). See Check Authorization 1999, supra
note 12, at 9 tbl. Those statistics also reflected a significant increase over the previous year. See
Check Authorization 1998, supra.
17. Check Authorization 1998, supranote 16, at 8.
18. Doubtless there is also some element of insurance, using third parties to spread the ineradicable element of the bad-check risk. Given the large size of many of the most prominent
American retailing chains, however, I suspect that the risk-spreading element is a relatively
small part of the transaction.
19. Two additional options that I do not discuss here are the stored-value card and olectronic money. Although the stored-value card has become reasonably popular in Europe, see
Britain Sets Smart Card Plan To Beat Fraud,REUTERS, Mar. 15, 1999 (reporting plans for the
issuance of 100 million smart cards in Britain); Norway Group to Use Proton's Technology, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 22, 1999, at 12, 12 (reporting programs using Proton brand smart cards in Nor-
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A debit card appears indistinguishable from a credit card,
but the practical and legal consequences of a debit card transaction
are quite different from those of a credit-card transaction. Technologically, the merchant that accepts a debit card uses an on-line

connection to the check-writer's financial institution to obtain a
contemporaneous verification of the customer's willingness and
ability to pay. Thus, the merchant knows before the consumer
leaves the register that it will obtain payment for the transaction
20
without further costs or effort.

Even more importantly, the network agreements among the
merchant, the merchant's financial institution, the card network,
2
and the card-issuing bank do not provide any right of chargeback. 1
Applicable federal statutes draw a similar distinction between the

Electronic Funds Transfer Act permitting finality in debit-card
transactions and the Truth-in-Lending Act barring finality in

credit-card transactions. 22 Hence, unlike a credit-card transaction
(or, for that matter, a check transaction), 23 the debit-card transac-

tion is functionally final at the moment of sale, with no party hay-

way, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), availableat 1999 VL 21143501, it has not yet
become a significant general payment device in this country. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYM4E."r
SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 256-67 (1999) (providing a general discussion of
stored-value cards). Electronic money is still further from practical realization, but at least in
theory it would provide merchants in Internet transactions the same kind of immediate verification of payment as the text discusses for debit cards. See id. at 272-80; Jane Kaufman Winn,
Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition Betuen Established and Emerging Payment
Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECL LJ. 675, 691-702 (1999) (discussing reasons why electronic payment systems have been slow to gain market share in this country).
20. See MANN, supra note 19, at 141-53 (providing a general discussion of the mechanics of
debit-card transactions).
21. See id. at 116-21, 124-38, 146-53 (discussing chargeback provisions in credit-card and
debit-card network agreements).
22. See id. at 116-21, 144-48. I criticize that distinction in a manuscript addressing the
policy implications of technology changes for consumer rights in payment systems. See Ronald J.
Mann, A Payments Policy for the Information Age 10-14, 17-25 (1999) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
23. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (2000) (describing the customer's right to stop payment). The customer's right to stop payment terminates when the customer's bank makes final payment of the
check. See id. § 4-403(a) (limiting the issuing bank's obligation to stop payment to situations in
which it receives notice "at a time and in a manner that affords the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it before any action by the bank" that would obligate the bank to pay the item
under U.C.C. § 4-303). Hence, the decline in the time that it takes to collect checks, especially
local checks, has diminished considerably the value of the stop-payment right in ordinary consumer retail transactions. See AM. BANKERS ASS'N, CHECK FRAUD SURVEY REPORT. 1998, at 20,

32 tbL6 (1998) (reporting 1997 statistics indicating that 89% of banks make funds from local
checks available to business accounts on the same day or the next day after the deposit); MANN,
supra note 19, at 42-54 (describing procedures that collect many local checks in a single day).
Nevertheless, the right that remains still seems significantly more favorable than the immediate
finality that characterizes debit-card transactions.

1634

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:4:1627

ing a later right to retrieve the payment from the merchant except
through the cumbersome device of a suit claiming that the merchant breached its obligations in the transaction.
The debit card, as an idea, has existed for decades. 24 But it
had little practical significance at the point of sale until the last few
years during which debit-card usage has skyrocketed. Thus, debit
cards were used for less than one percent of consumer payment
transactions in 1994, but almost five percent in 1998.25 To put that
in sharper perspective, during that same period, debit-card usage
rose from five percent of card-based transactions to twenty-one percent. 26 Industry analysts expect that rise to continue with debitcard usage expected to overtake credit-card usage by 2007.27 Even
more importantly, the last few years have seen the introduction of
the first general-use debit cards, operating under the Visa and
MasterCard logos. Those cards have contributed to most of the rise
in debit-card usage. Indeed, starting from less than 400 million
transactions in all of 1994 worth only $5 billion, the Visa and
MasterCard systems already had grown to more than 42 million
active accounts, used during the first half of 1999 to complete about
1.8 billion transactions worth more than $70 billion.2 8 It is difficult
to identify all the causes for the timing of the recent rise in debitcard usage, but it does seem clear that it is attributable largely to
the effects of information and communications technology that have
made it more and more practical for merchants to maintain pointof-sale terminals with contemporaneous dial-up connections on a
register-by-register basis. 29 Because the cards bring merchants a
shorter checkout time than checks and cheaper discounts than

24. See DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
SYSTEMS 7.02[1][a], at 7-2 to 7-5 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing point-of-sale debit systems as early
as 1966).
25. Consumer Payment Systems, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), July
1995, at 1, 6; Payment Systems, supranote 12, at 6.
26. See Card Transactions,NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Dec. 1999, at

1, 8-9; Debit CardsDefined, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA), Feb. 1995, at 1,
5.
27. See Card Transactions,supranote 26, at 9.
28. See U.S. General Purpose Cards, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Oxnard, CA),
Aug. 1999, at 1, 9-10; see also Visa and Mastercard-US1998, NILSON REP. (HSN Consultants,
Inc., Oxnard, CA), Apr. 1999, at 1, 5-7 (providing more detailed statistics for the full 1998 year).

29. See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 306-10 (1999) (documenting the rise of PIN-pad merchants and offering possible explanations for its rapidity and timing).
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credit cards, it is easy to see why merchants choose to accept
them.3 0
As a practical matter, then, the advances in infrastructure
and technology that have fostered the broad rise of the debit card
have lowered merchant verification costs by permitting the merchant to substitute certain knowledge of contemporaneous payment
for the uncertain assertion of future payment that accompanies the
checking system. Conceptually, that direct verification removes the
need both for the third-party verification provided by the existing
check-guarantee services and for the more primitive after-the-fact
verification available to the merchant doughty enough to sue the
bad-check writer. Although it is difficult to quantify the cost advantages of that shift, the rapid appearance of the soon-to-be ubiquitous point-of-sale debit-card terminals suggests that the savings are
substantial.
It is difficult to move from the checking example to a broader
generalization about areas in which information technology will
lead to direct verification of information, but it is easy to see two
limitations. The first is the nature of the transaction. Direct verification of information can be helpful only in transactions in which
the information already exists at the time of the transaction: transactions in which the assertion relates to present or past occurrences. Thus, it cannot directly improve the verification of assertions about future performance (most frequently a feature of credit
transactions).
That is not to say that information technology cannot improve verification in future-performance situations. For one thing,
the example I used above is one in which information technology
30. Even at the most highly favored merchants (e.g., grocery stores), charges on credit
cards, including both the interchange fee and the charges of the acquiring bank, are approxi.
mately 1.4% of the purchase price, while charges on traditional debit cards are in the range of 3
to 11 cents. Charges on the newer off-line debit cards offered by MasterCard and Visa are
somewhere in between, but still significantly higher than traditional debit-card charges. See id.

at 132; Charles Keenan, Debit Card Acceptance Heats Up Feud over On-Line vs. Off-Line Versions, An. BANxER, Mar. 13, 1998, at 1, 12. Perhaps the most unclear thing about the debit card
is why it is attractive to consumers. Compared to the credit card or the check, the consumer
loses the float on the transaction. Debit cards also tend to have considerably smaller affinity

programs. See Helen Stock, In Debit Card Market, Loyalty ProgramsAre Shaping Up as the
Next Battleground,AM. BANKER, Feb. 25, 2000, at 1, 10 (discussing the relative rarity of debitcard affinity programs). Finally, although most consumers doubtless are unaware of it, the protections for unauthorized transactions under the Electronic Fund Transfers Act for debit cards
are considerably less generous than those for credit cards under the Truth-in-Lending Act.
Compare Electronic Funds Transfers Act § 909, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (1994) (establishing protections for debit cards), with Truth-in-Lending Act § 133, 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994) (establishing
protections for credit cards). For a general discussion, see MANN, supra note 19, at 125-38, 14853. See also Mann, supranote 22 (criticizing the formal legal distinction).
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dispensed with the need for future performance entirely. 3 1 More
generally, institutions that improve the investor's ability to assess
the present facts relevant to the future performance-credit scoring
and the pooling discussed below, for example-plainly improve the
investor's ability to verify the target's assertion of future performance. The information technology, however, cannot speak directly to
the future performance (as it can to the historical-fact issues discussed above) and thus must leave the information problem at least
partially in place.
The second limitation is less definitive, a perception that information technology is likely to permit direct verification only in
transactions involving relatively simple and objective information
(Is the check good or bad?). If the information is more complicated
or subjective (Is this company a good investment? Is this the best
mountain-bike on the market for my needs?), information technology is less likely to result in direct verification of the information
because the costs to the individual user of verifying the information
are likely to remain higher than the value of the information. That
does not mean that the information cannot be verified. It only
means that the merchant will rely on a third party that specializes
in assessing the point in question, most commonly one of the socalled "information merchants" that I discuss below. Thus, even in
an information-technology age, there is good reason to believe that
information users will continue to rely on institutions for verifying
all but the simplest information. The question, then, is what those
institutions will be, the topic of Part II of this Essay.

II. INDIRECT EFFECTS: ENHANCING VERIFICATION
INSTITUTIONS
Although the range within which information technology can
foster direct verification of information by the parties to financing
transactions is relatively limited, the range within which it can
lower the costs of the information asymmetry is quite broad. That is
because the general decrease in the cost of information should enhance the functioning of many types of verification institutions.
Using those enhanced institutions, the net costs of the asymmetry

31. The genius of the debit-card example is that it uses technology to convert the future performance implicit in the paper-based processing of the check transaction to contemporaneous
performance based on electronic processing. That is not feasible in lending transactions, because
deferred performance is the central purpose of the transaction, not simply an unfortunate side
effect of ineffective clearance institutions.
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(that is, the costs of any ineradicable information asymmetry plus
the costs of the institutions used to manage it) can be reduced farther than they could through the use of less sophisticated institutions. This part of the Essay discusses three separate areas in
which those developments have appeared already: reputational
verification; intermediation by pooling; and professional collection
and sale of information. In each area, I argue, those developments
presage an enhancement in the importance of non-legal sanctions
and other privately arranged institutions with a corresponding
stagnation or decrease in the importance of legal and other publicly
devised institutions.
A. Reputational Verification Systems
The most general effect of information technology arises
ineluctably from the decreased cost of collecting and analyzing information: a general enhancement of the effectiveness of reputational verification, the simplest information-based sanction.3 2 It is
easy to see several reasons why reputational verification should
work better as information becomes less costly. 33 For one thing, enhanced information flows make it much easier for a lender to be
sure that it has obtained (and can count on continuing to obtain)
reliable information about reputation-relevant events.3 Similarly,
by lowering the costs of analyzing information, information technology makes it easier for the lender to assess the significance of
the information that it has obtained. That effect plays out in several ways. For example, it is easier for the lender to match particular pieces of information with particular transactions. Also, it is
easier for the lender to develop reliable methods of quantifying less
objective events, which makes it easier for a lender to rely on such
events in assessing the reputation of a borrower or potential bor35
rower.
Those effects are crystallized in the rise of computerized systems for routinely collecting and evaluating publicly available in-

32. For a general discussion of the mechanics of reputational verification, see Mann. supra
note 1, at 2252-57.
33. For a similar perspective focusing on the venture-capital industry, see D. Gordon Smith,
Venture Capital Contractingin the InformationAge, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L 133, 156.70
(1998).
34. See Mann, supra note 1, at 2256 (explaining why reputational sanctioning works better

when it is easier for lenders to obtain information about their borrowers).
35. See id. at 2256-57 (discussing the importance to a system of reputational verification of

objective indicators of misconduct by the borrower).
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formation about potential borrowers.8 6 Some of the effects are simple information-sharing arrangements. Major telephone companies,
for example, have an information clearinghouse that makes it easier to identify consumers who fail to pay their telephone bills in a
timely manner. 37 With more complexity, lenders in an increasingly
broad range of transactions use credit-scoring systems to enhance
their underwriting practices. Those systems rapidly (in a matter of
minutes) collect and evaluate information about a particular borrower, reducing the information to a single number that provides a

statistically valid prediction regarding the likelihood that the borrower will default if the proposed loan is granted. 8 Indeed, companies now are aiming for something even more valuable, models that
can predict which customers are most likely to file for bankruptcy!8 9
Lenders also are using similar technology to evaluate existing borrowers. In that context, the early-warning system periodi-

cally collects publicly available information, sorts through it for information relevant to the lender's portfolio, and then alerts individ40
ual officers about warning signs relevant to a particular loan.
Those systems make reputational enforcement much more effective
than it could have been just a few years ago because they accelerate

the point at which negative information reaches the responsible
41
officer of the lender.

36. For a lucid and impressively prophetic discussion of the effects of improved information
flows on investors, see Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structureof Secu.
ritiesRegulation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 747, 757-59 (1985).
37. See Who Watches Your Credit?: Agencies You've Never Heard of Are Keeping Tabs on
Your Spending Habits,at httpd/cnnfn.cnn.com/1999/06/02/life/q.creditaccess/ (June 2, 1999).
38. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1, 30-34 (1997) (discussing the mechanics of credit-scoring and its importance to smallbusiness lending); Judith Trotsky, Quick Credit Scoring and Decision-Making Are Critical,
FUTUREBANKER, June 1999, at 34, 34 (discussing importance of credit-scoring for small-business
lending).
39. See Lisa Fickenscher, Eyes on Credit: Software to Predict Bankruptcies in Demand, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 4, 1999, at 9, 9, availableat 1999 WL 6033085.
40. See Mann, supra note 38, at 34-36 (discussing early warning systems).
41. The efficacy of those systems is evident from the persistent trend in the consumer
credit-card markets towards ever riskier groups of borrowers. As those systems increase in sophistication, they allow their users to make ever more reliable judgments about the relative
creditworthiness of quite risky borrowers. See, e.g., Lisa Fickenscher, Specialty Issuers Buffer
Big Banks Easing into Subprime Card Market, AM. BANKER, June 3, 1999, at 1, 12 (describing
the process by which "[c]ustomers once considered eligible only for secured cards are now being
offered standard credit cards"). As one banker explained, credit scoring allows the bank "to
distinguish between highly and mildly risky customers. There is a difference between a doctor
who filed for bankruptcy and an immigrant who has come over here to go to graduate school."
Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The obvious conclusion to draw from the foregoing is that
reputation will become a more widespread verification device than
it has been in the past. To offer just one possible significant result,
consider the use of reputation in the public credit markets. 42 I have
argued that investors in publicly issued debt obligations rely heavily on the reputation of the issuer, and that one of the key determinants of the ability of an entity to sell such obligations at a reasonable price (a price that produces savings on interest costs that exceed the higher transaction costs of the public debt issuance) is the
issuer's ability to offer a significant reputational bond. 43 Because
only the largest companies return to the markets with sufficient
frequency for their reputational bonds to be adequate to support
that kind of debt, the public debt markets are generally limited to a
small portion of the economy, only the very largest companies. 44
The decreasing cost of information and the corollary increasing effectiveness of reputational sanctions do suggest, however, that the lower limit on reputational enforcement should fall
significantly, permitting marginally smaller firms to begin to issue
public debt. Moreover, as noted in the first part of this Essay, any
such shift would be accelerated by a decline in the costs of direct
assessment of information about the party issuing the debt.4 5

It is easy, however, to overstate the effects of that shift. The
most prominent arena in which that shift has started to bear fruit
is in the area of the direct public offering (commonly referred to as
a DPO). The last few years have seen the creation of several services allowing small businesses to issue securities directly over the
46
Internet without the intermediation of any investment bank.

42.

For a generally approving discussion of reputational sanctions in that market, see David

A-Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file vith author).
43. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Patternof Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L REV. 625,
671-74 (1997).

44. See Mann, supra note 1, at 2254-55 (discussing the link between size of the borrower
and efficacy of the reputational bond).
45. I do not mean to suggest that the markets providing that information are, or ,ill become, perfect. For criticism of some existing practices in the ratings industry, see Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand.IncreasingPractices in Antitrust Law, 66
ANTITRUST LJ.1, 42-48 (1997) (analyzing allegations that Moody's uses threats of bad ratings to
force debt issuers to purchase Moody's ratings services). For a more optimistic view about the
competitive state of the ratings agencies, see Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, Differences of
Opinion and Selection Bias in the Credit Rating Industry, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1395, 13961400, 1405-16 (1997) (concluding that issuers do not use differences among agency rating scales
to mislead investors).

46. See Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet. Rethinking the Regulation of Small
Business CapitalFormation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L 27, 37 (1998); Jill E. Fisch, Can
Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business CapitalBarrier,2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L
57, 75-77 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet. The Elusive Promise of "T'echno-
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Hundreds of companies, going directly to the capital markets with47
out any intermediary, have taken advantage of that opportunity.
Similarly, companies are now trying to use the Internet to solicit
48
potentially interested investors without issuing securities. Supporters of those systems herald an age of direct transactions between the investors and portfolio companies without the use of any
49
intermediaries.
At least to date, however, the results of those direct stock
markets have been disappointing to their supporters. Generally,
they have attracted a relatively small number of issuers, who have
succeeded in raising only the most modest sums of money. 50 The
analysis above, however, offers a simple explanation for the disappointing results those markets have faced. As I emphasized above,
information technology does not magically produce a world of perfect information. Rather, it produces incremental (albeit large) reductions in the cost of information, reductions that incrementally

logicalDisintermediation"for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.

L. 1, 11-12 (1998); Andrew R. Thompson, Note, Taming the Frontier?:An Evaluation of the SEC's
Regulation of Internet Securities Trading Systems, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 165, 167 (discussing such sites). Those systems follow in the footsteps of a number of pre-Internet systems (most
prominently ACE-Net) that also tried to produce disintermediated investments in small businesses. For a good summary of those earlier systems, see Langevoort, supra, at 7-9.
47. See Elizabeth Brandon-Brown, Direct Public Offering--A Viable FinancingOption for
Small Businesses (reporting 358 offerings by 185 companies in 1996), at http://www.directstockmarket.com/DSMExt...asesList/5BllEEB53E393D1882564D4006094B2 (last visited Oct. 21,
1997).
48. See Langevoort, supranote 46, at 9-10.
49. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s)of the Internet on Modern

Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1200 n.21 (1997) (listing such statements); see also
Direct Stock Market, The Direct Stock Markets Technology (stating that DPOs through DSM
empower investors, giving them the ability to communicate directly with company principals,

view Virtual Roadshows, and evaluate company information), at http:l/www.directstockmar.
ket.com/html/how/forpartners.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2001); DPOCentral International,
What Is a DPO? (The Internet offers a tremendous new medium for DPOs ... Mhe Internet [is]
the perfect tool for offering stock to the public."), at www.dpocentral.com/Resources/EducationlDPOs/whatis.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2001); Drew Field Direct Public Offerings, What Are
the Advantages of a Direct Public Offering? ( DPO's offer a competitive advantage in the marketplace by strengthening customer loyalty."), at www.dfdpo.com/aboutdpos.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2001). For an early, guarded statement to that effect, see Langevoort, supranote 36, at 764.
50. See Fisch, supra note 46, at 79; Thompson, supra note 46, at 167; James Kim, Net
Breathes New Life into Old Concept: Direct Public Offerings Let InvestorsAct Like Venture Capitalists, USA ToDAY, July 20, 1999, at 01B (reporting that 321 companies filed for direct public
offerings in 1998, but that analysts expected only a third to complete their offerings successfully), availableat 1999 WL 6848342; Jennifer Mann, Specialists Offer Advice on How To Raise
Money, J. REC., July 6, 1999, 1999 WL 9846989 (reporting that direct public offerings to date
have raised only $1 billion, from 800 successful offerings, while angel investors fund about $20
billion each year); Brandon-Brown, supra note 47 (reporting that only 30% of 1996 direct offerings succeeded, while about 95% of stock-exchange and NASDAQ IPOs succeeded).
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enhance the efficacy of reputational sanctions. Those incremental
enhancements, though, are least likely to be effective in the area of
initial public offerings by extremely small enterprises, because
those companies often have no track record to support an existing
reputation and insufficient size to support a large reputational
bond without such a record. 51 Rather, those are precisely the types
of companies likely to benefit most from the ability to use the reputational bond of a third party.52 Thus, those planning on lending to
(or investing in) such companies are likely to retain considerable

skepticism about the information problems associated with those
companies, even in a world of improved information technology.53

The basic problem is that the direct stock markets have set
themselves too hard a task. Advances in information technology are
likely to lower the size hurdle for posting significant reputational

51. See Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGINGBUS. L. 91, 92-95 (1998) (discussing the limited usefulness of the Internet
for small companies in reducing information transfer costs between issuer of securities and investor); Fisch, supra note 46, at 78; Langevoort, supra note 46, at 14-15. To get a sense for the
tiny size of the offerings, the statistics reported in Mann, supra note 50, suggest an average size
for a successful offering of only $1.25 million. By contrast, the first 361 conventional public
offerings in 2000 raised a total of $66.9 billion for an average offering amount more than one
hundred times as large at about $185 million. See Catch of the Day: IPO Buyer's Marbet, at
httpJ/www.redherring.com (Sept. 14, 2000) (on file with author).
52. See Mann, supra note 1, at 2269-71 (discussing reputational intermediation in the issuance of securities).
53. There are, of course, other difficulties in disintermediated investments in those companies. One is the obvious potential for fraud, which is aggravated by the influx of unsophisticated
Internet day-traders. See Choi, supranote 46, at 37-38; Coffee, supra note 49, at 1222-27; Fisch,
supra note 46, at 80-83 (discussing increased risk of fraud with Internet postings); Brian E. Taptich, Microbes Invade the Net, RED HERRING (reporting that microcap.stock scars have quadrupled in the last five years and discussing various schemes for fraud and manipulation), at
http/Jww-redherring.comindexasp?layout-story&doc-id=1590012759&channel=70000007
(Nov. 1, 1999).
On the other side of the coin is the problem that many of the companies in question would
benefit both from sophisticated guidance in the listing process and from careful monitoring.
Thus, as Don Langevoort reasons persuasively, the promise of the Internet for those companies
is much more likely to be a promise of an easier time locating angel and venture-capitalist-type
investors than a promise of a prompt public offering. Langevoort, supra note 46, at 16-19; see
Fisch, supra note 46, at 84-88 (suggesting that small businesses using disintermediated fundraising channels would suffer from the lack of advice that they would get if they used conventional intermediated channels); Ronald J. Gilson, Understandingthe Choice Between Public and
PrivateEquity Financingof Early Stage Companies:A Comment on Barry and Turki, 2 J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L 123, 126-29 (1998) (suggesting that the monitoring and governance structure of venture capital companies explains the greater returns obtained by development-stage
companies that have venture-capital support, as compared to those that obtain equity from public offerings). The recent widely noted success of"incubator" illustrates the importance to startups of the advice and contacts available only through intermediaries that bring relations with
the money they provide. See generally Peter D. Henig, And Now, Econets, RED HERRING, Feb.
2000, at 96 (discussing the rapid rise of venture incubators and their development into broader.
more enduring economic networks).
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bonds, so that the next tier of smaller companies-those just beneath the smallest traditional public issuers-should develop reputations sufficient to support the issuance of underwritten public
securities. The credibility associated with these small issuers will
be bolstered by the traditional reputational intermediation provided
by investment banks.54 Similarly, but at a larger level, the same
factors eventually should allow relatively smaller issuers to issue
public securities directly without the assistance of that intermediation.
Those developments nonetheless provide little help to the issuers that currently appear on the direct stock markets. Those
markets currently are populated by so-called "micro-cap" investments, very small companies seeking very small amounts of
money. 55 Their initial efforts did not succeed well because they were
far smaller than the smallest companies that typically issue intermediated securities, to say nothing of their minuscule size compared to those companies readily able to issue disintermediated securities. Thus, where others view the limited success as proof that
information technology will bring few changes to the institutional
arrangements of public fund-raising, I view the more recent evidence of an upward trend in direct public offerings 56 as surprisingly
positive given the obstacles to those offerings discussed above. 7
The harder question, for which I have no persuasive answer,
is why so few large companies have taken advantage of those institutions to issue disintermediated securities. My analysis suggests
that those institutions should work well for companies large enough
to dispense with intermediation, especially in high-tech markets
likely to attract computer-literate investors. Although I cannot yet
explain that phenomenon, my general impression is that it arises
from a combination of three factors. First, a variety of SEC-imposed
rules limit the usefulness of the Internet-based markets by making
it difficult to use those markets to raise large sums of money.5 8 Sec-

54. It is difficult to evaluate that question empirically, because numerous other factors are
likely to affect the size of initial public offerings, the most prominent being the supply of money
into the market for such offerings and the general level of optimism in the market at the time in
question.
55. Thompson, supranote 46, at 167 n.11.
56. See Kim, supra note 50, at 01B (presenting recent data from www.dsm.com, indicating
321 direct public offerings in 1998).
57. See supra note 53.
58. See, e.g., Coffee, supranote 49, at 1210-13 (analyzing how the SEC should respond to di.
rect stock offerings); Fisch, supra note 46, at 64-65 (explaining the traditional SEC limitations on
direct offerings).
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ond, successful companies may be reluctant to expose themselves to

the possible adverse reputational effects of adopting novel methods
of financing. Why take a risk on market reaction to a novel financing method if current financing is not a problem?5 9 If the incremental cost advantages are small,6" even a slight adverse reputational effect might be enough to deter a shift in financing method in
the short run. Third, because fewer investors purchase in the direct
markets than in the traditional markets, it will continue for some

time to be difficult for large issuers to obtain financing at rates as
low as the rates that they can obtain in the more populated conven-

tional public debt markets.
In my view, however, none of those obstacles can long withstand the basic cost advantage of disintermediating a substantial
portion of the transactions. First, the SEC has shown every intention of facilitating Internet transactions in a safe way, so it seems

unlikely that it will adopt a regulatory posture that makes those
transactions permanently difficult. 61 Second, the last few years

59. As Jill Fisch explains:
Investors may also view the absence of outside expert involvement in Internet
offerings as a negative signal. Investors may reasonably perceive that an issuer who bypasses the traditional underwriter route does not meet the quality
standards of the investment banking community. After all, if an issuer can
raise more money through a traditional IPO, why would a company that qualifies to do an IPO choose a DPO instead?
Fisch, supra note 46, at 79; see Coffee, supra note 49, at 1204 (suggesting that such an issue
might be "a desperate gamble by an issuer with no other alternatives").
60. On that point, I do not think it is a coincidence that one of the main forces driving direct
public offerings is a perception that the fees charged by investment bankers are excessive. See
Drew Field Direct Public Offerings, supra note 49 (Direct public offerings are considerably less
expensive than traditional underwritten offerings... ."); Gregory M. Kratofil, Jr., Internet Can
Serve Your Company's Capital Needs, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 29, 1999, at D12 (reporting costs
of traditional intermediated offering as 15% while costs of a direct disintermediated offering are
only 6%), available at 1999 WL 2422779; David Lipschultz, Wide Open, RED HERRING, June
2000, at 387, 392-96 (discussing how the high costs of traditional IPOs are spurring the search
for successful models for Internet-distributed IPOs); Mann, supra note 50 (reporting that direct
public offerings are relatively cheap, because "using underwriters also adds 7 percent to 10 percent to the cost of an offering"); More Companies Than Ever Do Their Own IFP3, BUS. WIRE, Apr.
2, 1999 (reporting that the cost of a traditional IPO usually is about 1536 of the total amount
raised, compared to 3% on a typical $1 million direct public offering).
61. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 49, at 1215-16 (discussing the SEC's response to Wit-Trade's
unauthorized bulletin-board trading system); Fisch, supra note 46, at 69-75 (discussing the
SE(Ys beneficent attitude to Internet securities trading). That is not to say that the SEC is sanguine about the Internet as a securities market. On the contrary, the SEC seems quite alert to
the possibility-indeed, the reality-that Internet transactions will lead to fraud and sharp
dealing to the detriment of investors. See lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Levitt Warns Traders of Online
Excesses, WAsH. PosT, May 5, 1999, at E03 (reporting broad SEC investigation of disclosure
compliance by online trading firms), availableat 1999 WL 17001260; Fisch, supra note 46, at 8182 (discussing SEC responses to Internet-related securities fraud); Gretchen Morgenson, Online,
Day TradingSubject of Federal Probe, SEATTLE POST-INTELUGENCER, Aug. 30, 1999, at C5 (reporting SEC probe of adherence of online brokerages to regulations regarding short sales), avail-
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have seen a huge increase in the number of investors that populate
the Internet markets, which, at this point, seems quite adequate to
provide sufficient capital for even the largest issuers. 62 Thus, although the process has gone slowly to date, I continue to believe
that the coming years will witness a rapid increase in disintermediated issuances and in intermediated public issuances by ever
smaller companies. The deeper point for this Essay, though, is the
motive force behind that trend, the increased effectiveness of the
non-legal reputational sanction.
B. Intermediationby Pooling
The previous Section analyzed how advances in information
technology enhance the ability of a first-party verification systemthe ability of the borrower to use a reputational bond to mitigate
information problems in its financing transactions. Information
technology also has fostered the growth of securitized transactions
in which a large group of information-problematic transactions can
be verified through the intervention of an intermediary that pools
the transactions and sells small interests in the pool as a whole.
The key to that process, from my perspective, is the way in which
information technology has made it feasible for the intermediaries
that pool the transactions to provide en masse assessments of
transactions for which the most cost-effective practice formerly was
case-by-case, lender-by-lender examination.
To understand the magnitude of the advance in information
verification, consider the information problem presented by the individual home-mortgage transaction. 63 The key piece of information
in that transaction is the likelihood that the borrower will repay
the loan as agreed. The relatively low credit standing of the average
home-mortgage borrower makes it difficult for the borrower to use
its reputation or anything else to verify that assertion. 64 Accord-

able at 1999 WL 6600302; SEC Charges 44 with Internet Securities Fraud,REUTERS, Oct. 28,
1998 (reporting SEC prosecutions for Internet securities fraud).
62. See, e.g., A Play for the Big League, GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 1999 (discussing comments by
Alan Greenspan and Bill Gates about the "irrational exuberance" and "gold rush" mentality of
investors rushing to Internet-related investments), availableat 1999 WL 12070147.
63. I use that example because (as explained below) that is the context in which this typo of

pooling securitization first succeeded. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the
early history of home-mortgage securitization).

64. I do not mean to suggest that home-mortgage borrowers are less creditworthy than
other individuals, only that they generally are less creditworthy than the large corporations that
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ingly, the potential investor in such an obligation must resort to
some other device for assessing the reliability of that assertion. As
it happens, a thorough assessment of the assertion involves a considerable body of information, ranging from objective items like the

borrower's income and outstanding debt, and the value of the home
in question, to more subjective items such as the possibility of un-

desirable future events like a default or prepayment by the borrower.
The market for such obligations traditionally operated on a
case-by-case basis with each lender evaluating each transaction and
advancing funds at a price (interest rate) that reflected the lender's
assessment of all of the relevant information regarding the likelihood of repayment. That case-by-case process was relatively expensive both because it was time-intensive and because the idiosyncrasy of the resulting obligations made them relatively illiquid.65

Developments in information technology, however, have
completely transformed that market. In the current economy, homemortgage notes are issued through a sophisticated set of institu-

tions that dramatically lower the transaction costs of assessing information and produce highly standardized obligations of great li-

quidity. The result is a significantly more efficient market for investment in home mortgages in the sense that the cost of borrowing
is significantly lower than it otherwise would be 6 G and also, perhaps
more significantly, in the sense that the market now includes a

typically borrow in the public debt markets in which mortgage-backed securities now are bought
and sold.
65. See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44
UCLA L. REV. 951, 969 (1997) (describing transactions in traditional home-mortgage markets).
66. It is difficult to quantify the degree of cost savings, but the figures certainly are substantial. See STEVEN K. TODD, THE EFFECTS OF SECURITIZATION ON CONSUMER MORTGAGE
COSTs 5 (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper No. 223585, 2000) (concluding that
origination fee costs in the home-mortgage market are reduced by about 0.5 basis points, approximately $2 billion, per year), at http'J/papers.ssn.comlpaper.tafabstract_id=223585.
A
variety of studies have reached varying conclusions regarding interest savings, but the most
conservative suggest a long-term interest-rate savings in the range of 20 basis points. See id. at
6-7 (reviewing studies examining the effect of securitization on mortgage market). The most
sophisticated analysis with which I am familiar concludes that borrowers in the home-mortgage
market realize some substantial savings from the process. Frank Byrt, UnderwritingSoftware
Turning Small Lenders into Bigger Competitors, AM. BANKER, Aug. 26, 1998, at 5, 5 (reporting
Fannie Mae estimate that adoption of automated underwriting would save borrowers $100 million per year in interest payments); see Karen Talley, Citi Sees Itself SccuritilingCorporateDebt
Worldwide, Am. BANKER, Mfar. 16, 1998, at 17, 17 (reporting that Citicorp's corporate securitizations usually bear interest rates about 50 basis points cheaper than conventional long-term financing).
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wide range of different submarkets with different rates and terms
for borrowers of differing credit quality.6 7
The first advance comes at the point of issuance, where the
credit-scoring systems discussed above generate relatively accurate
predictions of the risk of default based on a relatively small number
of data points. 68 Thus, the costs of collecting information have
shrunk considerably, while the accuracy of the resulting assessment has remained more or less the same (with your opinion on the
relative accuracy depending on your relative faith in the skill of experienced loan officers versus the skill of sophisticated computer
69
programs).
The more important piece of the picture, however, is what
happens to the obligation once it has been issued. The changes in
the process of issuance have resulted in a set of standardized obligations for which a set of standardized data points has been collected. 70 Information technology works in several different ways to
make it practicable for an intermediary to collect a large number of
those obligations, to pool them, and to issue securities representing
very small shares of the pool of obligations. 71 First and most obviously, it would not be practicable without relatively advanced information technology for the intermediary to perform the ministerial tasks of dividing the pool of obligations into huge numbers of
separate shares, monitoring the sums due to the holders of the
separate shares, and delivering payments to those holders. Moreover, the ability to perform computerized analyses of large pools of

67. For a general discussion of the newly developing sectors of the home-mortgage financing
market, see CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & JOSEPH R. MASON, HIGH LOAN-To-VALUE MORTGAGE
LENDING: PROBLEM OR CURE? 15-34 (1999).

68. See Mann, supra note 38; text accompanying note 38 (discussing the advent of creditscoring systems). The dependence of securitization on credit-scoring is suggested by the link
between the recent spread of small-business credit-scoring software and the rise of small.
business loan securitization. See Sara Nathan, Scoring, UnderwritingSoftware Being Linked to
Spur Securitization,AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1997, at 10, 10.
69. Another advantage of that software is that it considerably diminishes the advantage of
large issuers by lowering the entry barriers to the industry. The enhanced competition also
should work to bring down the costs of lending in the area. See Byrt, supra note 66, at 5 (reporting Fannie Mae estimate that the spread of automated underwriting would lower closing costs by
$2 billion a year and interest payments by $100 million a year).
70. The homogenization of the obligations has been accomplished by the almost universal

use of a single standard-form home mortgage. Information technology had nothing to do with
that process, which occurred simply because the standardization makes the pooling process
much simpler.
71. See Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 MO. L. REV. 249, 279-80 (1999) C"rechnology ...has facilitated the rapid sale of loans from their originators to the secondary market.").
For a thorough and informed summary of the securitization process, see Claire A. Hill, Securitization A Low-Cost Sweetenerfor Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1066-77 (1996).
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obligations allows the intermediary to rely on the law of large numbers to minimize the significance of any deviations from expected
performance, thus limiting the costs of inaccurate information.72
Finally, because of the liquidity of those small standardized shares,
investors accept a much lower return on those shares than they

would on individual underlying mortgages of a similar face value. 73

The effectiveness of that process is not purely hypothetical.
Since its introduction in the early 1970s by the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, that process has spread to a number of related quasi-governmental agencies (the Federal National Mortgage
Association and the Governmental National Mortgage Association)
and more recently to several large private financial institutions. 7 4 It

now completely dominates the home-mortgage industry, being used
to finance more than three-quarters of all new home mortgages is75
sued in this country.

That percentage should continue to rise as the technology
matures sufficiently to function effectively for less reliable transactions (the so-called "subprime" market).76 The system has the po-

72. See CALOMIRIS & MASON, supra note 67, at 36 (explaining that pooling of loans increases the predictability of average loan performance); see also MICHAEL 0. FuINELrEIN &
BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 117-22 (1990) (explaining statistical rules that limit
variations from expected amounts in large normally distributed populations).
73. For a basic discussion of the benefits of liquidity in this context, see MANN, supra note
19, at 469-70.
74. See 2 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITtAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 11.3, at 7078 (3d ed. 1993) (Practitioner Treatise Series) (discussing the growth of the market for mortgagebacked securities); Burkhart, supra note 71, at 275-76 (discussing the rise of private issuances
since the mid-1980s); Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law
and Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 270-76 (1999) (same). See generally PETER J.
WALLISON & BERT ELY, NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISIK THE GROWTH OF FANNIE ME AND
FREDDIE MAC (2000) (documenting and discussing dominance ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac in
residential mortgage market).
75. See Burkhart, supra note 71, at 274-77 ('By the mid-1990s, more than three-quarters of
the new single family residential mortgages were being securitized."); Schill, supra note 74, at
271 (presenting recent statistics on this phenomenon). As of December 1998, Federal Reserve
statistics indicated that securitized mortgage pools held about 53% of the total outstanding
mortgage debt on one- to four-family residences in this country. MortgageDebt Outstanding,84
FED. RES. BULL A35 (Dec. 1998) (noting that there was $2,232,659,000 combined total of mort-

gage pools or trusts for one- to four-family residences out of a total of $4,195,738,000 for that
same residence category).
76. See e.g., Karen Talley, Small Banks Stepping up High-LTV Securitizations, A.
BANKER, Jan. 20, 1998, at 7, 7 (discussing the increasing success of securitization by small banks
of high-LTV home mortgages); Heather Timmons, Pioneer of High LTVs Is Still the One To
Watch, Am. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1997, at 12, 12 (discussing the nascent use of securitization of
home mortgages issued in amounts that exceed the value of the home). The decline in the qual-

ity of loans being securitized is epitomized by the SECs recent decision to permit securitization
of packages of loans with up to twenty percent of the loans delinquent at the time the securities

are issued. See Aaron Elstein, SEC Shifts To Allow 201,' Delinquencies in Asset-Bac/Ieds, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 21, 1997, at 1, 26; see also Karen Talley, To Russia with Securitization:FannieIs

1648

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54:4:1627

tential to be unusually valuable in that area because of the relatively higher variability of return associated with loans of greater
risk. The problem risky loans present to investors is not just that
the likelihood of nonpayment is higher (something for which a
higher interest rate could compensate), but that the lender's estimate of the likelihood of nonpayment on any given loan is less
likely to be accurate. Pooling provides a substantial response to
that difficulty by allowing each lender/investor to obtain a share in
a pool of loans for which a large percentage deviation from the anticipated rate of default is much less likely than it would be for any
77
single loan in the pool.

A central part of the pooling system is the willingness of the
intermediary to make representations about the obligations contained in the pool that backs the securities. The investors do not
themselves examine the underlying obligations in any substantial
way. Instead, they rely on assertions by the intermediary as to the
general quality, geographical diversity, and aggregate payment
terms of the entire pool of obligations. 78 The reliability of those assertions, in turn, is verified by two separate institutions: the intermediary's reputational bond and a limited form of guaranty.
The most obvious is the guaranty; many intermediaries that
package such securities offer some guaranty of performance on the
securities. 79 Although a law-centered view of the process might view
that guaranty as much more important to the system than the informal reputational sanction, I am convinced that the customary
limitations on the guaranty leave considerable work for the reputational sanction to do. For one thing, guaranties are not universally
provided, and, even when they are provided, they do not always ap-

Helping Moscow Establish a 'NatashaMae,' AM. BANKER, Apr. 4, 1997, at 10, 10 (discussing

plans to securitize Russian loans despite the "steep" economic problems in Russia). Although
that market has experienced considerable dislocation as it has grown, see, e.g., Heather Timmons, Subprime Lender Files for Ch. 11 Reorganization, AM. BANKER, Oct. 5, 1998, at 16, 16

(discussing those problems), current conditions suggest that it will grow significantly in tho
immediate future. See Heather Timmons, High-LTV Securities Coming Back, with New Buyers,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 27, 1999, at 9, 9.
77. See Hill, supranote 71, at 1074-75.
78. See, e.g., KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES:
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 4-105 to -106, 4-111 to -114
(1999) (describing customary disclosures of information related to pooled mortgages); Hill, supra
note 71, at 1074-75.
79. See 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 74, at 72-75 (discussing guaranties of mortgagebacked securities by the quasi-governmental entities that issue them).
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ply to the lower tiers of securities.8 0 The most direct evidence to
support my view is the considerable disclosures the intermediaries
provide regarding the underlying obligations. 81 If the intermediary's
guaranty made payment adequately certain, then the investor
would have no need for that information; it would care only about
the payment terms of the security and the reliability of the guarantor.
More generally, it is easy to see four concerns about the securities that the guaranty does not assuage. First, the guaranties
are not costless to enforce; it is cheaper for an investor to receive a
payment in the ordinary course of business than to coerce payment
through exercising its rights on a guaranty. 82 Second, payment is
not sure even under a guaranty because of the possibility that the
intermediary will fail (a possibility that increases as a larger group
of purely private institutions begin to issue such securities).3
Third, the terms of the guaranties typically do not require
timely compliance with all payments due under the securities; thus,
even if the guarantor promptly complies with its obligations, the
investor may suffer some loss from deferred payment. 84 That is not
a mere technicality; knowledgeable observers believe that the market discounts the prices of the securities that include such provi85
sions to account for that problem.
Finally, in most cases, the guaranties do not protect the investor from the risk of prepayment. The "pass-through" structure
commonly used for those securities leaves investors exposed to a
relatively unattractive risk of prepayment. As homeowners make
payments on the underlying mortgages, the payments are pooled,
allocated, and passed through to the securities holders. Thus, when
individual homeowners repay their mortgages before their maturity

80. E-mail from Claire A. Hill, Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to
Ronald J. Mann, Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School (Aug. 20, 2000) (on

file with author).
81. See supra note 78.
82. See Mann, supra note 1, at 224849, 2260 (discussing the difficulties of relying on legal
action as a method of verifying the truth of assertions made by guarantors).

83. See sources cited supra note 74 (discussing privately issued securitized home-mortgage
obligations). It is also worth noting that there is some credit risk even among the governmentissued securities because, unlike Ginnie Mae securities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities
are not backed formally by the full faith and credit of the federal government. See 2 NELSON &
WHmAN, supra note 74, at 75; MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY 1MARE 63-64 (3d ed. 1990). The
significance of the separate credit strength of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is evident from the
close oversight Congress gives to the financial position of those entities. See 2 NELSON &
WHITMAN, supranote 74, at 73.
84. See STIGUM, supranote 83, at 63-64.
85. See id. at 64.
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dates (typically upon a sale of the home or refinancing of the mortgage), holders of the securities receive payments on their securities
sooner than the contractually required dates;8 6 because prepayments tend to come at times of low market interest rates, prepayments that come sooner than expected are costly to the investor. 87
Again, that is not a purely theoretical problem; for example, one
series of GNMA securities was prepaid in its entirety after only two
years because of underlying home-loan prepayments sparked by
falling interest rates in the 1980s.8 8
From my perspective, the reason that the unreliability of the
guaranty does not seriously trouble investors in home-mortgage
securities is that other information-based mechanisms are relieving
their uncertainty, the most important of which is the reputation of
the intermediary. The intermediaries function in a market ideally
suited for reputational verification. They are large entities that return frequently to the market with new issues of securities. Thus,
their reputations are quite valuable, probably essential to their continued existence. Furthermore, it is easy to assess their reputations
at any time. Events that should undermine their reputations are
objectively easy to identify-defaults on securities that they have
issued, defaults on their guaranties, or excessive prepayments on
securities that they have issued-and the information regarding
those events is rapidly and easily accessible to everybody involved
in the industry. 89 It should come as no surprise, then, that industry
periodicals publish statistics evaluating the quality of the under-

86.

See id. (explaining the prepayment risk inherent in a pass-through securities structure).

As Stigum explains, the likelihood of prepayment gives the typical thirty-year home mortgage an
expected life in normal interest-rate environments of only twelve years. Volatility in interest
rates, however, can alter that period significantly. See id. Interestingly, the subprime market

mitigates that problem by imposing prepayment fees on borrowers in their portfolios.

See

Heather Timmons, Subprime Lenders Use Prepayment Fees To Protect Their Portfolios, AM.

BANKER, Jan. 9, 1998, at 8, 8. Mainstream lenders resort to that device relatively rarely becauso
it generally would drive off borrowers at a rate unjustified by the savings to the lender. For
examples, see ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 820
(1998) (stating that lenders commonly trade 0.25% per year in annual interest-rate reductions
for a waiver of the right to prepay); Jim Gallagher, Mortgage Gymnastics Can Keep Rate Low, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 1999, at El (reporting that a bank was offering a 0.38% to 0.58%
discount on annual interest rates if borrowers accepted a two-percent prepayment penalty for the
first three years of the mortgage), available at 1999 WL 3035756.
87. The connection between low interest rates and refinancing is oft noted, see, e.g., 1
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 74, § 6.1, at 482; STIGUM, supra note 83, at 64, but low interest
rates also should spur prepayment caused by sales, because of the increased purchasing power
potential home purchasers acquire when interest rates fall.
88. See STIGUM, supra note 83, at 64.
89. See Mann, supranote 1, at 2254-57 (identifying those factors as crucial to the success of
reputational sanctioning).
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writing of the various issuers in the market.9 0 Hence, it is easy to
see why investors prudently would rely on the assertions of the
pooling intermediaries, even as to matters for which the intermediaries had not accepted any formal legal liability. 91
The power of that technology is illustrated not only by its
spread into the sub-prime market for home mortgages, but also by
its steady spread into completely different types of obligations, the
most interesting of which has been credit-card receivables. 92 The

most striking thing about those transactions is that the average
credit-card receivable is one of the least liquid obligations imaginable. Its quality depends upon the creditworthiness of the cardholder and the quality of the goods or services provided in the un-

derlying sales transaction out of which the receivable arose. 93 Yet,
pooling arrangements modeled on the mortgage-backed securities
described above have succeeded in providing low-cost financing for
literally hundreds of billions of dollars of securitized credit-card
receivables. 94 As with the home-mortgage market, it is difficult to
quantify the overall amount of the reduced interest costs, but the
rapid growth of the market suggests that they are substantial.
Another interesting feature of the credit-card securitizations

suggests that reputation appears to be particularly important to
investors in that market. Credit-card securities typically deal with

the high credit risk of the underlying receivables95 by providing for

90. See e.g., Joshua Brockman, Moody's Says Credit Risla Varies Among Issuers of Securitized Loan Pools, AMi. BANKER, Sept. 25, 1998, at 6, 6 (reporting varying assessments of the
credit quality of eleven prominent issuers of asset-backed securities).
91. One prominent executive explained: "[Trhe banking company knows that its name is on
the deal, and that blow-ups will tarnish its reputation [even if all investors are repaid in full]
.... 'I wouldn't want to have to explain to investors I sold a deal that didn't vork.' " Talley,
supranote 66, at 17.
92. See CALOAHRIs & MASON, supra note 67, at 13 (discussing the relative size of credit-card
securitization and other areas other than the government-underwritten conventional home
mortgages); see also Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization:The Case of the Disappearing
PoliticalRisk, 38 VA. J. INTL L. 293, 304-11 (1998) (discussing the rise of"future-flowse securitization in Latin America, transactions which cover not-yet generated receivables).
93. If the goods or services were not satisfactory to the cardholder, the cardholder has a variety of rights to withhold payment under the Truth-in-Lending Act. See MANN, supra note 19,
at 116-21, 124-25 (discussing rights under Sections 161 and 170 of the Truth-in-Lending Act).
Perhaps just as significant, the individual dissatisfied with the goods or services might refuse to
pay even if the Truth-in-Lending Act does not excuse payment. That is a much less likely scenario in the case of a home mortgage, particularly one that has been outstanding more than a
few months.
94. See Aaron Elstein, Chargeoffs Raise Specter of Early Investor Payouts, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 18, 1997, at 1, 1 (reporting more than $100 billion of such sales in the early 1990s, making
credit-card securities at that time the "largest sector in the asset-backed securities market).
95. The receivables pooled into securities are not immune from the general riskiness of
credit-card receivables. See id. at 30 (discussing chargeoffrates of 4-6% in securitized credit-card
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an early repayment of the securities if the value of receivables in
the pool deteriorates below a certain trigger level. 96 That mechanism does protect investors from the risk of nonpayment, but it also
leaves them exposed to a substantial risk of prepayment, a risk that
imposes its own costs on the investors.
Given the general riskiness of credit-card receivables, it is
not surprising that, on several occasions, the value of the receivables in a securitized credit-card pool has fallen below the trigger
level. In every case except one (a 1991 incident involving a minor
issuer), however, the issuer has responded promptly and voluntarily to replenish the pool of receivables so as to prevent an early
payout.9 7 Thus, at least one industry observer believes that an early
payout would have a sufficiently bad impact on an issuer's reputation that issuers would prefer to replenish pools voluntarily rather
than suffer the ensuing harm to their reputations. 98

The story of pooling is a telling one because it illustrates the
power of transaction design to provide opportunities for substantial
reductions in information costs. The subject transactions are, as
noted above, conspicuous for their illiquidity and for the unimpressive credit strength of the borrowers liable on the underlying obligations. Yet, by the device of intermediated pooling, the market can
bring into play powerful non-legal reputational sanctions to verify
information at costs that-if market success is an informative indicator-are significantly lower than the costs incurred under less
sophisticated arrangements.
The relation between legal sanctions and non-legal sanctions
is less direct here than it was in the prior sections of this Essay because none of the developing institutional arrangements directly
alter the sanctions that the lenders use against the defaulting bor-

pools). As if that risk were not enough, an increasingly common transaction securitizes futuro
receivables: credit-card receivables from future sales transactions. See Hill, supra note 92, at
300-04; Aaron Elstein, Mexican Banks Use a GuarantorTo Securitize Future Card Sales, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 17, 1997, at 24, 24.
96. See CALOMIRIS & MASON, supra note 67, at 43 (discussing mechanisms for early payout);
Elstein, supra note 94, at 1 (same); Aaron Elstein, Investors Shrugging off Concerns over Banc
One Card-Backed Security, AM. BANKER, Jan. 29, 1997, at 24, 24 (explaining that those "securi-

ties come with self-destruct mechanisms that automatically pay investors if the portfolio deteriorates too far").

97. See Elstein, supra note 94, at 30 (discussing practice of replenishment); Elstein, supra
note 96, at 24 (discussing cases of replenishment by Mercantile Bancorp and Chase Manhattan

Corp.).
98.

Elstein, supra note 94, at 30; Elstein, supra note 96, at 24.
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rower. The structures of the transaction itself-all of the steps from
the originator to the investors-depend heavily both on sophisticated information technology and on reputational sanctions. It is
those stages that have produced the staggering influx of money into
the fields in question, an influx that has come despite the stagnant
nature of the formal legal institutions available to solve information
problems endemic in the underlying financing transactions.
C. Direct Sales of Information
This part started by discussing improvements in the simple
two-party institution of reputational verification, and continued
with the quasi-intermediated institution of pooled securitization. It
closes in this subpart with consideration of the effects of information technology on third-party verification. On that point, the most
likely effects appear to come in the area of information merchants:
commercial enterprises that sell information that partially or completely resolves the information asymmetry that confronts the
lender.9 9 As I have explained in earlier work, third-party verification institutions face an inherent difficulty. If the third party inserts itself into the transaction as an intermediary, it has a conflict
of interest that undermines the credibility of its assertions. 100 In
some cases that can be overcome if the lender and the third party
have some basis for "trust"-a phenomenon that occurs most significantly in this country in the context of angel investing1 0L -but
those kinds of relationships depend on contextual factors that are
difficult to replicate on a widespread basis.10 2
Conversely, several basic strategic problems make it difficult
for an unbiased third party to collect the information itself and to

99. The organization builds on a general discussion and typology of third.party verification
institutions that appears in Mann, supranote 1, at 2257-71.
100. See id. at 2269 (discussing that problem for reputational intermediation in the securities
industry). For empirical evidence that the conflict is significant enough to affect market prices
and other practices, see Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Conflict of Interest in the Issuance ofPublic Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital,42 J.L. & ECON. 1, 20-24 (1999) (presenting evidence indicating (a) a positive relation between the amount of underpricing of initial public of.
ferings and the relation that the underwriter has to any preexisting venture-capital investor,
and (b) that investment banks respond to that problem by targeting their investments at less
"information-sensitive" issuers).
101. See Mann, supra note 1, at 2265 (discussing angel investing as an alternative to traditional venture capital investments and the less adversarial relationship maintained between the
investor and the entrepreneur).
102. For a wide-ranging discussion of the effectiveness of trust-based institutions in the information age, see Paul S. Adler, Market, Hierarchy,and Trust. The Knowledge Economy and the
Futureof Capitalism,ORG. SCL (forthcoming 2001) (on file with author).
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profit by selling it to the lender. One problem, commonly referred to
as Arrow's information paradox, makes it difficult for the information merchant to persuade the lender that its information is valuable without disclosing the information. 103 Another problem is the
low cost of replicating and disseminating the information: once the
third party discloses the information to the lender, it is difficult for
the third party to prevent the lender from transmitting the information rapidly to others who would not have to pay the third party
10 4
for the information.
It seems likely, however, that advances in information technology will allow information merchants to defeat those problems so
that the provision of information for a fee will become much more
practicable than it has been in the past. Because the feasibility of
charging for raw information fosters a rapid specialization in the
collection and analysis of information, it should, in turn, foster a
considerable advance in the feasibility of all forms of informationbased sanctioning in commercial transactions. 10 5
As with the comments on pooling, that discussion is not entirely hypothetical. On the contrary, anecdotal information suggests
that the process already has begun. The rapid rise of a population
of almost innumerable Internet retailers of widely varying capacities has spurred a secondary industry of "infomediaries" such as
Epinions, ConsumerReview.com, and Deja.com. 10 6 For example, in
the consumer credit area, a wide variety of sites have developed for
the express purpose of collecting, analyzing, and selling information
likely to be useful to potential creditors. 107 Similarly, creditors
whose businesses allow them to collect large amounts of informa-

103. See Mann, supranote 1, at 2267-68 (explaining Arrow's information paradox).
104. See id. at 2267 (discussing "free-rider" problem where lenders resell information ob-

tained from third party at profit).
105. Cf. Choi, supra note 46, at 45-46 (predicting Internet-based certification services aiding
investors in publicly traded securities).
106. See Peter Rojas, The Buying Game, RED HERRING, Feb. 2000, at 48, 48 (The Web has
made many users wary, and with good reason."); Bob Tedeschi, Comparison-shoppingSites Have
Felt the Shakeout but Hope that a Diversified Source of Revenues May Serve as a Buffer, N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at C6 (discussing the difficulty such sites face in developing practicable
business models).
107. Any list of such sites would be doomed to be outdated by the time this document was
printed from my computer, but a sense for the burgeoning industry is evident from the following
sources. Who Watches Your Credit?, supra note 37 (discussing the rise of new kinds of special.
ized credit agencies such as tenant screening services, check guarantee and verification companies, debit-credit bureaus, and telephone credit clearinghouses). A partial list of sites that already are up and running would include www.knowx.com,
www.informus.com,
www.advsearch.com, www.people-wise.com, and my favorite at least based on name alone,
www.digdirt.com.
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tion about individual consumers are recognizing the value of that
information and refusing to allow broad industry use for free as
they customarily have in the past. 108
Although that process has not yet gone as far in the commercial lending context, it does seem to be starting. For example, one
site called Bestcalls.com collects information about stock analyst
conference calls with publicly traded companies and disseminates
the information to investors.1 09 Other services are starting to provide information about customized portfolios in a "streaming" format similar to the familiar Pointcast service, but specializing in
financial information.110 A more telling anecdote came to me in an
interview with an executive of a nascent Internet initial-publicoffering service.1 ' As explained above, my analysis suggests that
the Internet stock markets will have difficulty in raising large sums
of money without some mechanism to satisfy investors regarding
the credibility of the issuers whose stocks they list." 2 The individuals who operate those markets recognize the investors' desire for
verification of information about the potential investments that
those markets offer.1 3 Given the tiny size of most current issuers in
that market, it is not practical to rely on the classic securitiesmarket device of obtaining verification by intermediary investment
banks. The transactions of the micro-cap issuers that currently
populate those markets are too small to bear the large fixed costs of
a traditional investment-bank supported transaction (a transaction

108. See Lisa Fickenscher, Lenders Hiding Credit Data, and Regulators Object, AM. BANER,
July 7, 1999, at 1, 7 (describing the withholding ofcredit information from credit bureaus).
109. See Megan Barnett, Startup Bestcalls.com Dials for Dollars (discussing the launch of
that service, which currently is free), at http/wwv.thestandard.comfarticleqfdisplay/0,1449,3952,00.html (OMar. 24, 1999). It is possible, however, that the recently proposed
SEC Regulation FD-which would require that material information disclosed to analysts be
simultaneously disclosed to the public-would foster the development of such services, or at least
the regulation would permit dissemination over such a service simultaneously vith a conventional disclosure. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 337787, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42259, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24209.
[1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC-) T 86,228, at 82,847-859 (Dec. 20, 1999),
1999 SEC LEXIS 2696.
110. See Carol Power, Internet Start.Up Offering Market Data at a Discount, AM. BANKMR,
Jan. 19, 1999, at 17, 17 (discussing a new software product designed to facilitate the use by
banks of market information about their clients), availableat 1999 WL 6031730; Megan Barnett,
Quote.com Mulls Merger (summarizing a site that provides financial information and predicting
that this site would begin providing streaming information by the end of 1999), at
http://www.thestandard.comarticles/display/0,1449,2910,00.html (Dec. 18, 1998).
111. See Telephone Interview with Clay Womack, President, Direct Stock Market (Nov. 12,
1997) [hereinafter Womack Interview].
112. See supranotes 50-56 and accompanying text.
113. See Womack Interview, supranote 111.
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in which the quality of the investment is verified by the investment
bank's insertion of itself into the transaction as a reputational in114
termediary).
Responding to that difficulty, one vendor decided to persuade
analysts to provide information for a fee without intermediation.
Thus, investment banks do not obtain a share of the offering that
they are in a position to resell to their customers. Instead, analysts
could examine information related to the issuer and post a report at
a button on the issuer's home page at Direct Stock Market. For a
nominal fee (in the range of five dollars), a potential investor could
click on the button and obtain the analyst's assessment of the issuer.115
An analogous device appears at www.iexchange.com. At that
site, individuals post their views regarding stocks that are likely to
rise or fall. The site tracks the accuracy of the picks and ranks the
most accurate predictors based on past performance. Those who
visit the site can download current picks for a fee. The system
works by rewarding most profitably those whose predictions appear
116
to be the most accurate.
When I first learned of those programs, I thought little of it.
It seemed to me nothing more than a less grand device to provide
intermediation to small companies, solving the information verification problem without the large fees and expenses associated with
traditional investment-bank reputational intermediation. 117 Upon
further thought, however, the shift seems to provide a pointed illustration of why those types of mechanisms are ideally suited to developing conditions: they provide more effective verification of the
relevant information, and highly sophisticated information technology is required for those mechanisms to function successfully. The
following Sections elaborate on those two points.
1. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Verification
On the first point, a comparison between the traditional intermediation arrangement and direct sale of the information suggests that direct sale of the information is superior in two respects.

114. See id.
115. See id.

116. For a discussion of that site, see Telephone Interview with Clay Womack, President, Direct Stock Market (Nov. 29, 1999).
117. See supra note 60 (citing information about the size of traditional investment-bank intermediation fees).
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First, from the perspective of the potential lender or investor, direct
sale of the information provides a better product because the motives of the information merchant are not contaminated by the intermediary's financial interest in the issue. 118 When investors purchase from an investment bank that is underwriting an issue, in-

vestors have to worry about the investment bank's motivation to
suppress negative information that might harm the prospects of a

successful issuance. 119 Similarly, although less seriously, free information-not backed by a reputational sanction-is unlikely to be
adequately reliable to alter significantly the structure of transactions.
In contrast, when an investor purchases information directly

from a disinterested third party, the investor has little reason to
worry about mixed motives. The merchant's primary incentive must
be to sell information of sufficient accuracy to support a reputation
for accuracy and to avoid legal liability for misrepresentation. The
merchant will suffer much more from a perception of poor judgment

or misrepresentation than it will if an offering that the merchant
assesses fails because of negative information provided by the mer-

chant. That situation is directly contrary to the situation that faces
an investment bank intermediary. 120

Of course, the investor might not have access to the advantageous remedies that the securities laws afford against an intermediary like an investment bank, but then there are good reasons

118. Of course, the customer also does not have the comfort of knowing (as he or she does in a
transaction with an intermediary) that the information comes from somebody who has put his or
her own money in the same investment.
119. For one particularly disappointing story, see KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENr ON THF ROcK
(1995) (recounting story of Prudential-Bache's misuse of investor funds for personal expenses).
Even if reputational constraints can solve that problem, a less direct conflict arises when (as
often happens) the investment bank has a venture-capital subsidiary that has invested in the
issuer. The available evidence suggests that the marketplace perceives a substantial conflict of
interest in that arrangement, which is reflected in relatively greater underpricing of such stock
issues. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 100, at 20.22. That problem seems to be mitigated,
however, by the investment banks' tendency to select a less information.problematic portfolio of
issuers in which they are both an equity investor at the venture-capital stage and an underwriter at the IPO stage. See id. at 22-24.
120. For trenchant criticism of investment-bank conflicts, see Marguerite Reardon, Analyst
Owns $9M in ONI Systems Stock, at httpJ/www.lightreading.com/documentasp?docid=1664
(Sept. 12, 2000). One might think that the information is less reliable because the information
supplier is not putting money on the line. But that is true only if the possibility of a loss on the
intermediary's investment in the target is a more effective sanction than the loss of a reputation
of credibility for the information merchant. Obviously those two effects will have differing relative weights in differing circumstances. My point here is that it is easy to believe that in many
contexts the reputational sanction that verifies information provided by an information merchant will be more effective than any sanction available against the conflicted intermediary.
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to doubt the general effectiveness of such remedies. 121 Thus, it
seems quite plausible to me that a professional, Internet-based information merchant would be at least as motivated by pure reputation-based sanctions as a traditional investment bank would be by
the combination of legal sanctions and reputation-based
22

sanctions. 1

To be sure, it is easy to imagine situations in which the motives of the information merchant could be contaminated. For example, consider the outcome of an arrangement in which a directstock-market issuer could prevent analysts from posting negative
reports on the issuer's home page. 123 In that arrangement, the analysts would have a significant financial incentive to produce positive reports because only positive reports would be posted so as to
provide revenue to the analyst. For the information merchant to
provide information that has a credibly high quality, the arrangement has to limit such contrary incentives. That suggests, in turn,
that the arrangements will function most effectively if they include
credible disclosures of the relations between the information merchant and those about whom the information merchant provides
information. With information technology, those disclosures readily
could be made effective through the development of a third-party
124
verification service.
Direct sale of information also fosters a more competitive
market for the provision of information by unbundling the sale of
information from other services. In the traditional intermediary
situation, the investment bank provides an array of services to the
issuer including such things as advice on structuring the issue and
expertise at marketing the issue. Thus, there is no separate charge
to the issuer for the service of reassuring investors regarding the
reliability of the issuer's assertions about its operations.

121. See Mann, supra note 1, at 2248-49, 2262 n.142 (summarizing some of those difficulties).
122. That view is supported, of course, by my view that reputational sanctions generally are
enhanced by the advances in information technology discussed in Part II.A of this Essay.
123. The direct-stock-market issuer might wish to prevent negative comments because nega-

tive comments would be likely to harm the prospects for the issues as to which the negative
comments were made. If the direct-stock-market issuer depends on fees from issues posted on its

network, it might wish to deter those negative comments. Those types of conflicts have become
increasingly controversial as the importance of website information has grown. See, e.g., Michelle V. Rafter, Cheap, Cheaper, Cheapest (discussing controversies about finder's fees that
Amazon.com receives from those to whom it gives favorable site placements and reviews), at
http://www.thestandard.com/articles/display/0,1449,3003.O0.html (Dec. 31, 1998).
124. The obvious model would be something like TRUSTe, which is being developed to satisfy
privacy concerns raised by the Federal Trade Commission. See Industry Hopes Seal-of-Approval
ProgramsWill Meet PrivacySelf-Regulation Challenge, 67 U.S.L.W. 2396 (1999).
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Hence, it is not clear that the investment bank provides such
a service. Large, blue-chip companies, for example, have little need
for verification of their assertions by an investment bank because
their own reputations provide an adequate mechanism for verification. Accordingly, a competitive market would drive total investment-bank charges to those companies down to a level that included nothing for reputational intermediation. Yet, the current
bundled charge for all investment-bank services makes it difficult
to tell if that occurs because the bundled charge obscures both the
provision of information by the intermediary and the charges imposed for the service of providing it.
By contrast, when verification is provided directly by a disinterested third party, all parties know exactly what is being paid for
the information and precisely the format in which the information
is being provided. Although it is possible that market will suffer
from defects of its own-those discussed above and others I do not
foresee' 25-the transparency of that arrangement should lead to a
much more competitive market than the currently bundled and
opaque arrangements, and thus in the end to more effective provi1 26
sion of information.
2. The Effect of Information Technology
The preceding Section explains why it might be better to
have information merchants instead of information intermediaries,
but it does nothing to explain why advances in information technology might support the growth of information merchants. The freerider problem that afflicts traditional information merchants' 27 continues just as surely in this context. For example, returning to the

125. See Choi, supra note 46, at 50-54 (noting the superior abilities of public regulators to

provide certain kinds of information); see also Bob Tedeschi, Some Online Sellers Are Hiring
Prominent Auditors to Their Verify Privacy Policies and Increase Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2000, at C12 (discussing problems with TRUSTe and the increasing competition TRUSTe faces
from Big Five accounting firms).
126. See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 15. That assertion rests in part on my view that the
rapidly decreasing cost of information in Internet markets already has produced visibly enhanced competition in a variety of markets related to financing transactions, such as the markets for home-mortgage loans and for certificates of deposit. For example, www.lendingtree.com
provides a marketplace in which home-mortgage borrowers can comparison shop for loans from a
large group of mortgage lenders physically located over the entire country. For statistics, see

Hala Habal, Study Sees Steady Growth for Internet-Only Lenders, AMi. BANKER, Oct. 15, 1999, at
9, 9. The continuing emergence of new formats like www.priceline.com can only enhance the

general level of competitiveness.
127. See Mann, supranote 1, at 2267-69 (discussing "free.rider" problem).
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anecdote from the preceding Section of the Essay, suppose that an
analyst expends resources analyzing a potential issuer and developing a succinct description of the issuer's prospects. The analyst
then posts that description at a prominent location on the Internet,
where potential investors can purchase it for five dollars. After the
first purchaser pays five dollars for the information, what is to stop
the purchaser from reselling the same information for one dollar to
those who inquire later, or, indeed, from giving the information
away for free? 128 If that free-riding problem offers a substantial explanation for the general rarity of information markets in the preinformation technology environment, the low cost of disseminating
stolen information in the information age has the potential to make
the free-riding problem even worse.
Information technology, however, offers three advantages to
those trying to solve that problem and to develop functional information markets. The first point arises from the direct lowering of
information costs.129 As information technology lowers the cost of
information (so that the user need only push a button on a home
page instead of placing a telephone call or ordering the information
through the mail), the transaction costs of purchasing the information directly can fall below the transaction costs of obtaining it from
a pirate. To put it another way, when you can obtain information
legitimately and directly by typing in a URL and clicking on a button at the corresponding Internet site, how much effort will you expend to locate an information pirate that will give you the information for a lower price (or for free)?
Similarly, given a perception that it is at best marginally
honest to purchase or obtain information from the pirate, norms of
honesty may limit the likelihood that investors will patronize information pirates when they can obtain the information legitimately for a nominal fee. 130 Although that might sound rather implausibly trusting, one of my interview subjects in the direct stock
market area assured me that the norm against free riding appears
to be the primary backstop on which he is relying in designing the
system described in the previous Section of the Essay. He simply

128. See Choi, supra note 46, at 47 (noting "free-rider' problem).
129. This point is borrowed directly from Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July
1995, at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.07/dyson.html.
130. For a prominent articulation of that point, see Robert Wright, Dead Head, SLATE (explaining that the cost of stealing information includes "informal punishments such as being
labeled a cheat or a cheapskate" and that "[t]he size of th[ose punishments] will depend on how
norms in this area evolve"), at http://slate.msn.com/earthling96-10-03/earthling.asp (Oct. 3,
1996).
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does not believe that a significant number of investors will download and repackage the information available from the analysts'
buttons. Only time will tell if he is correct.
The second advantage is a partial technological solution to
the free-rider problem. By the use of so-called "trusted systems," an
information merchant can limit the ability of the pirate to undercut
the merchant's market by making it difficult for the pirate to save
the information or to print it out for dissemination to other potential customers.' 3 ' Those systems have much the same effect as copy
protection had for software in the early 1980s and as Macrovision
has for VCR tapes now. 132 Essentially, those systems provide information in an encrypted form that can be read only on a terminal
that has special decryption software provided by the merchant. If
the user has a key that can be obtained from the merchant on a
case-by-case basis, the software decrypts the requested information
so that the user can view (but not save or print) the information.
Without the key, the user cannot even view the information. 133
Those systems cannot solve the free-rider problem completely-the user could photograph the monitor screen, transcribe
the information, or perhaps compromise the software 13L--but they
do substantially raise the transaction costs of piracy. In particular,
they counteract the cost-reducing effects of the Internet and computerized information processors because now the information thief
must reenter the information manually and upload it to the Internet before disseminating it. The costs of that operation substantially increase the marginal cost of the information to the thief,

131. See Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCI. AMI., Mar. 1997, at 78, 79-80 (discussing the
technology of trusted systems). I thank Paul Resnick for help on that topic.
132. See Stephen A. Booth, Copy.proof CDs, POPULAR SCI., Oct. 1, 1999, at 59, 59 (discussing
Macrovision technology and its coming extension to music CDs); Gordon Brockhouse, Under
Wraps-New Encryption Systems Could Spell the End for Many Types of Home Recording,
STEREO REV., Nov. 1, 1998, at 38, 42 (discussing Macrovision technology and its coming extension to home taping of movies and music); see also ROBERT A. GORuAN & JANE C. GINSBURG,
COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 513-14 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act that will limit home recording of most programming not disseminated
by free over-the-air television).
133. See Stefik, supra note 131. Digital watermark technology has a similar purpose, hut it
does not prevent copying. Instead, it allows the owner of the stolen information to identify the
source of the stolen information by examining unique marks placed in the authorized distributed
copies of the information. See Alan Zeichick, Digital Watermarks Explained, RED HERRING, Dec.
1999, at 270, 270.
134. As it happens, Congress recently criminalized the act of compromising such software.
See GORWAN & GINSBURG, supra note 132, at 773-76 (discussing provisions regarding copyright
management information). That strikes me, however, more as evidence that hackers frequently
attempt to compromise such software than as evidence that such attempts promptly will cease in
response to the statute.
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substantially limiting the thief s ability to ruin the market of the
information merchant. Taken with the low cost of the information
and the intangible costs of violating anti-piracy norms discussed
above, the further hurdle posed by the trusted systems diminishes
the potential for piracy further.
The third advantage is also technological: the ability of the
merchant to charge for the information on a bit-by-bit basis. As discussed above, one of the key features that should bolster the efficiency of information markets is the transparency of the pricing
arrangements. Under traditional payment systems, however, it
would not be cost effective for the merchant to charge a large number of users separate five-dollar fees for each item of information
that the users obtain. The transaction costs of any of the traditional
systems for remote payment (with credit cards being the best existing candidate for instant completion of remote payment transactions) are too high for such a system to function effectively. 13 5 Thus,
to the extent that information merchants have begun imposing fees
for their information (as a few news providers have done), they generally obtain payment on a subscription basis, where the user
makes a single monthly payment that allows the user free access to
all of the merchant's information. 136
For many users, the fixed monthly subscription fee might be
an optimal arrangement-how many of us prefer an Internet service provider that offers unlimited access for a fixed fee?-but it is
unlikely to be an optimal solution for all users because the fixed fee
is likely to exceed the value that the merchant can provide to lowvolume users. Thus, the system probably would work more effectively, attracting a larger volume of customers, if it were practical
for the merchant to offer metered pricing plans that allowed some
users to pay for each item of information that they obtain.
Information technology offers electronic money as a nascent
solution for that problem. Essentially, electronic money is a payment system in which the currency is encrypted "ecoins" that a purchaser can provide to a merchant as payment in remote Internet
transactions, and for which the merchant can obtain credit in ordi-

135. See MANN, supra note 19, at 270-72 (discussing the reasons for the current dominance of
credit cards as a payment device in Internet transactions).
136. For general discussion of subscription-based merchants, see Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 627, 629-30
(1998). As I write, prominent examples of the subscription-fee model include ESPN Insider (at
www.espn.com) and TheStreet.com. On the other hand, the New York Times (www.nytimes.com)
currently charges $2.50 on a per-article basis.
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nary funds from the operator that issued them.1 37 Electronic money
is designed specifically to provide payment for very large numbers
of micro-payment transactions (eventually as low as small fractions
of a single penny) and thus offers negligible per-item transaction
costs. 138 Hence, it is an ideal mechanism for merchants that wish to
offer per-item pricing for the information that they sell. By facilitating per-item pricing, electronic money can allow such systems to
gain ever larger user bases, which in turn should lower their average per-item costs of providing information.
To be sure, it remains to be seen whether there is a sufficient
need for that kind of micro-payments system,13 9 but the basic point
seems sound: notwithstanding the inability of the parties to an information transaction to meet face to face, the technology is available to facilitate reliable and inexpensive payment for even the
smallest transactions. That can only foster the spread of the information merchant.
III. CONCLUSION
Information technology is a literally Protean feature of our
current economic arrangements. As quickly as we understand how
it solves one problem, innovators apply it to solve a different problem or engineers develop a better technical device that collects or
analyzes information still more quickly than any previous device.
Thus, this Essay cannot hope to provide an explanation for where
information technology will take us. I only hope to offer a preliminary sense of how it will take us there.
The main point of this Essay is to highlight one important
aspect of the changes that information technology will bring to'financing transactions, the increasing efficacy with which it will
transmit and process information that affects reputation. Information technology does not seem likely to lower the cost of enforcement through the legal system, but it will bring a substantial reduction in the costs of the various information-based mechanisms

137. For a general discussion of electronic-money systems, see MANN, supra note 19, at 27280.
138. See id. at 272.

139. See Winn, supra note 19, at 691-702 (discussing the obstacles that have impeded the
spread of electronic-money systems); Alex Gove, Mad Money (quoting a leading venture capitalist

analyst as arguing that electronic money is unnecessary because "content providers will find that
it is cheaper to give away content than to charge minuscule amounts; customers who make
larger purchases will either pay on a subscription basis or use their credit cards to make immediate purchases"), at httpJ/iwww.redherring.com/inde--asplayout-story&docjd=570016257&channel=70000007 (Feb. 1, 1997).
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that provide alternate sanctions. As those sanctions improve, they
will bear more and more of the weight of the task of resolving and
mitigating the information asymmetries that are endemic to all financing transactions. 140
That has two implications. First, it suggests that scholars
trying to understand those transactions should spend a greater portion of their efforts studying the private arrangements reflected in
the design of those transactions and a lesser portion of their effort
studying the formal legal rules that purport to govern those transactions. Second, and more chillingly, the information-based mechanisms function well only with free flows of information. As we are
just beginning to understand the privacy issues raised by those free
flows,' 4 ' it is disconcerting to understand the importance to the financial sector broadly of maintaining and even enhancing those
flows. Abrupt termination of those flows-not nearly as far-fetched
a concern as you might think142 --would have far broader consequences than a minor lowering of bank-industry profits.

140. I do not mean to suggest that there is no role for government. Curtis Milhaupt suggests
that the SEC's activities in the area could develop into something truly useful. See Curtis J.
Milhaupt, The Small Firm Financing Problem: Private Information and Public Policy, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 177, 191-93 (1998) (describing the important functions of regulation
in the venture capital market). Also, as Peter Swire has shown, the government can play a key
role in facilitating those sanctions by providing for the standardization of mandatory information
flows that private parties can analyze. See Peter Swire, Public Feedback Regulation: Learning
To Govern in the Age of Computers, Telecommunications, and the Media (1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
141. For a few critical comments, see Don Clark & John R. Wilke, Firms To Unveil Plans To
Protect On-Line Privacy, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1997, at B9 (discussing consumer.privacy advocates' criticisms of consumer information-service companies), available at 1997 WI-WSJ
2423452; Peter Huber, Tangled Wires: The Intellectual Confusion and Hypocrisy of the Wired
Crowd, SLATE C'Information wanting to be free doesn't seem so appealing when it includes do.
tails about all your flesh and frailties-credit history, shopping habits, records of where you've
been, what you asked for, and what you took."), at http://slate.msn.com/features/tangledwires/tangledwires.asp (Oct. 18, 1996). For more nuanced views, see Swire, supra note 8, at
477-507 (analyzing government access to information). See generally PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT
E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BusINEss: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE
EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998) (analyzing the difficulties of implementing the European
Privacy Directive in our economy).
142. See Dean Anason, AdministrationInsists Customers Get a Say in All Data-Sharing,Ai.
BANKER, July 22, 1999, at 2, 2 (discussing Clinton administration proposals that apparently
would allow consumers to veto all information-sharing about their transactions with banks).

